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________ 
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_________ 
 
 
BRAD A. NICHOLS,  
                              Appellant 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-00839) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora B. Fischer 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2010 
 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed    December 15, 2010 ) 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Brad Nichols appeals the denial of his claim for supplemental Social 
Security Income (“SSI”).   
I. 
 Nichols is a 26 year old man with a 12th grade education and a previous work 
history as a busboy and pantry worker.  In July 2005, Nichols filed an application for SSI, 
alleging disability since 1995 due to Crohn’s Disease, irritable bowel syndrome, allergies, 
asthma, hyperthyroidism and depression.  Following a denial of the application, Nichols 
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).   
 At that hearing, Nichols testified he was diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease at age 
eight or nine, and suffered from severe cramping, abdominal pain and body aches as a 
result of his condition.  Nichols further stated that during his previous job he required 
four restroom breaks during the work day.  Additionally, a vocational expert testified that 
a hypothetical individual of the same age, work history, and education, subject to specific 
environmental limitations and a sit/stand option, could not complete any of Nichols’ past 
work, but identified other positions such an individual could complete.  However, when 
asked if employment existed if that individual additionally required five restroom breaks 
per day, the vocational expert stated no work would be available.   
 The medical evidence included a Medical Statement Regarding Social Security 
Disability Claim completed by Dr. Andrew C. Fackler, M.D.  Dr. Fackler indicated 
Nichols possessed no capacity to work, could stand or walk for no more than two hours 
per day, required a sit/stand option, suffered from severe fatigue at times, required 
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environmental restrictions related to his breathing problems, and could occasionally lift 
up to 50 pounds.  Dr. Fackler also found Nichols suffered from severe pain and marked 
restrictions in his activities of daily living, marked difficulty engaging in social 
interactions, and deficiencies in his concentration.  Dr. Fackler’s treatment records 
indicated that Nichols had been treated for injuries sustained while lifting weights, 
grinding metal, and working with a hammer.  In contrast, treatment records from Dr. Ram 
Chandra, a pediatric gastroenterologist who had periodically treated Nichols, indicated 
that Nichols had bowel movements once a day to once every other day and his symptoms 
were stabilized with the use of medication.   
 Dr. Joseph Altman, a psychologist, provided a narrative report and treatment 
notes.  In his narrative, Dr. Altman stated that Nichols was unable to work due primarily 
to his physical problems, suffered from a Major Depressive Disorder and suffered a long 
history of anger management problems within the context of his family relationships.  Dr. 
Altman specifically stated that Nichols’ mental limitations were less significant than his 
physical limitations.  Dr. Altman also noted that Nichols spent much of his time playing 
on the computer or watching television and had few social acquaintances.   
Nichols was also examined by Dr. Anthony Goreczny, a psychologist, who 
reported that Nichols had marked impairments interacting with co-workers and 
supervisors, and responding to the pressures and changes in a work environment.  Dr. 
Goreczny noted that Nichols was overly dependent on his parents and that Nichols’ 
“acquiescence of responsibility would obviously not be acceptable or tolerated well in a 
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work environment.”  However, Dr. Goreczny also noted that Nichols related well to 
others in superficial interactions.   
Nichols’ records were reviewed by Dr. Roger Glover, a state agency psychologist, 
who determined that Nichols’ claims were partially credible.  Dr. Glover refused to give 
full weight to Dr. Goreczny’s report due to its inconsistency with the total record, and Dr. 
Glover found the opinion in the report to be an overstatement of Nichols’ functional 
limitations.  Dr. Glover found that Nichols was able to meet the basic mental demands of 
work despite the limitations resulting from his impairment. 
 Following the hearing, the ALJ denied Nichols’ application because his 
impairments did not meet the listing criteria, he possessed residual functional capacity 
(“RFC”) to  perform light work, and jobs that Nichols could perform in light of his age, 
education, work experience, and RFC existed in sufficient number.  Nichols commenced 
a civil action seeking review of the Commissioner’s denial of his SSI application.  The 
District Court denied his motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Nichols appeals.   
II. 
 Judicial review of a denial of SSI is limited to determining whether the decision to 
deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  When the 
ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are binding.  Knepp v. 
Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).  Substantial evidence requires only “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Pierce 
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quotations omitted).   
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 Nichols first claims the ALJ erred by improperly disregarding the medical 
opinions of his treating physicians.  While the findings of a treating physician are 
generally to be given greater weight than those of a physician who has treated the 
claimant once or not at all, see Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1997), an 
ALJ may discount the opinion of a treating physician when that opinion is inconsistent 
with other substantial evidence in the record, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2).   
 In this case, the ALJ’s decision not to credit Dr. Fackler’s opinion as to Nichols’ 
work capacity was supported by the inconsistency of that opinion with Dr. Fackler’s own 
physical assessment and Nichols’ treatment history.  While Dr. Fackler concluded 
Nichols had no work capacity, his own assessment documented that Nichols was able to 
lift up to fifty pounds and possessed the ability to stand or walk without the assistance of 
any device.  Additionally, Dr. Fackler’s own notes document that Nichols engaged in 
activities such as weight lifting and metal grinding.  The ALJ also noted that Dr. 
Fackler’s findings regarding the severity of fatigue were inconsistent with Dr. Chandra’s 
medical reports.  Given the specific findings of the assessment and Nichols’ ability to 
take part in some physical activities, the ALJ possessed substantial evidence to conclude 
Dr. Fackler had erroneously concluded that Nichols was unable to engage in any work.   
 Similarly, the ALJ’s decision to provide less weight to the opinions of Dr. Altman 
and Dr. Goreczny was supported by the inconsistency between their opinions and the 
evidentiary record as a whole.  While Dr. Goreczny found Nichols suffered from marked 
limitations in his ability to interact with co-workers and supervisors, and to respond to 
changes in the work setting, he noted that Nichols related fairly well during superficial 
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interactions.  The ALJ noted that Nichols’ social isolation was primarily attributed to his 
physical conditions and not the inability to behave appropriately.  Further, Nichols’ 
documented social problems were limited to his interactions within his family, and he 
was able to maintain social acquaintances and a relationship with a girlfriend.  Given 
these inconsistencies, the ALJ possessed substantial evidence to credit Dr. Glover’s 
opinion that Dr. Goreczny’s conclusions overstated the severity of impairment suffered 
by Nichols.   
 In each case, the ALJ weighed the opinions against the evidentiary record as a 
whole and made a credibility determination that alternate medical evidence was due 
greater weight.  Because an ALJ is not bound to follow a medical opinion simply because 
it is provided by a treating physician and substantial evidence existed to support 
providing less weight to each physician’s opinion, we conclude that the ALJ’s 
determination is persuasive. 
 Nichols has additionally argued that the ALJ erroneously determined Nichols 
suffered no mental impairment under the requirements of Listing 12.04 and erred in 
determining Nichols’ RFC.  Both of these arguments are premised entirely on the notion 
that the ALJ had to credit the determination of Nichols’ treating physicians.  However, 
Dr. Glover found no marked impairments of any of the part B functional areas of the 
listing.  For the reasons stated above, the ALJ’s decision to provide less weight to Dr. 
Altman’s and Dr. Goreczny’s opinions was supported by substantial evidence, as was the 
ALJ’s determination of Nichols’ RFC.   
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 Nichols claims that the ALJ relied upon incomplete hypothetical questions to the 
vocational expert.  A hypothetical posed to a vocational expert must account for all 
symptoms of a condition which cannot be remedied by treatment.  Podedworney v. 
Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).  In Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 
(3d Cir. 2005), this Court clarified that an ALJ may exclude from the hypothetical even 
those symptoms which are medically supported, if contradicted by other evidence in the 
record.  In this framework, the hypothetical posed by the ALJ was appropriate and 
constituted substantial evidence of Nichols’ RFC.  Dr. Chandra’s medical records stated 
that Nichols’ symptoms responded to treatment and that his bowel movements occurred 
once a day to once every other day.  While Nichols stated he had historically required 
four bathroom breaks a day, Dr. Chandra’s records contradict his claim, and thus the ALJ 
was permitted to exclude the condition from the hypothetical and still rely upon the 
response as substantial evidence of Nichols’ RFC.  
 Finally, Nichols argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of his subjective complaints of 
pain was not supported by substantial evidence.  Nichols contends that the ALJ made a 
credibility determination, which was based upon information regarding a life insurance 
policy which was not contained in the record.  The ALJ noted that the record established 
Nichols was able to travel, play football, walk two miles a day, engage in off-road dirt 
biking, play video games, and use a computer.  The ALJ relied upon Nichols’ previous 
denials of many of the subjective symptoms when he was seen by Dr. Chandra.  Even 
setting aside the ALJ’s references to the life insurance policy, there was substantial 
evidence to support the ALJ’s rejection of Nichols’ subjective complaints. 
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III. 
 For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
